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This Drief is a reply to the Brief submi 1 tr'd by
Cross-Il.c"~ponclant,

MARION W.

BECKSTROM, and is restri ,'ted tc,

the issues raised in the appeal before the Honorable Court
between MARION BECKSTROM and VERE BECKSTROM, and not the
appeal between Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants, NORMAND D.
LAUB and BARBARA LAUB,

and Cross-Defendants and Respondants

VERE BECKSTROM and ELIZABETH S. BECKSTROM.
Plaintiff and Cross-Respondant, MARION BECKSTROM,
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "MARION", states on page
5 of his Brief that the Cross-Appellant, VERE BECKSTROM,
hereinafter sometimes referred to as "VERE", used oxymoronic
logic in stating in his initial Brief:

"It was not until

MARION had abandoned both the Lewis property and the Hunt
property that he made any payment whatever on the mortgage
or on taxes."
The Court will recognize that the significanceof
that observation was that MARION did not worry about paying
any of the mortgage payments while his brother, VERE, was
doing so.

However,

since the mortgage was actually on the

Pine Valley property, which had been used as the security cc
borrow the money to purchase the Hunt property, and was not
on the Hunt property when he, MARION,

abandoned the Hunt

property, he was only concerned with making the final mort~'·
payment for the purpose of preserving the Pine Valley pro~J
not the Hunt property.
That was simply one additional circumstanre
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~vidoncing

MARION's abandonmont of the Hunt property.

Even though he denied that was his only motivation in the
trial, circumstances are more pursuasive that he was then
only concerned with preserving the Pine Valley property for
himself.

He was giving up any interest he may have claimed

in the Hunt property, and he was obviously concerned that
VERE, under those circumstances, might not continue to pay
the payments on the Pine Valley mortgage, so he paid the
final payment on it.
MARION's Brief, page 5, states that that payment
was made directly to RODNEY SNOW, the mortgagee of the Hunt
property.

Though SNOW had loaned the money to buy the Hunt

property, his mortgage, as security for the loan, was on the
Pine Valley property, not the Hunt property. (Tr. P54, LL2l-26)
Cross-Appellant is greatly concerned about

a

practice engaged in by Cross-Respondant in his Brief before
this Court.

MARION, in his Brief before this Court often

cites from depositions of either MARION BECKSTROM or VERE
BECKSTROM to support statements of alleged fact.

However,

even though the deposition may have been "published" during
the trial,

the only portions thereof that were evidence be-

fore the Trial Court, or for that matter, this Court, were
those specific items, if any, which were read into the
record at the trial from the deposition, either over the
objections of opposing parties, or without objection of the
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opposing parties.
If an entire desposition were simply and arbitrarily
admitted in its entirety, as evidence in a trial, because
of the liberal discovery rules applicable to depositions,
and the customary waiver of all objections, except as to
the form of the question until the trial, havoc would be
wreaked upon the rules of evidence insofar as admissibility
is concerned.
Cross-Appellant respectfully and strenuously submits that the liberal and repeated use of citations to
depositions by the Cross-Respondant in his Brief, is improper and any fact sought to be established by such a
citation in Cross-Respondant's Brief should be disregarded
in its entirety by the Court, unless the specific question
and answer was read into and admitted into the record by the
Trial Court.

Cross-Appellant submits that few, if any,

questions and answers were read into the trial record, and
even then,

if it were done, the proper citation by Cross-

Respondant should be to the trial record, not the depositioo
Cross-Appellant submits that Cross-Rcspondant's
use of great numbers of "facts" not substantiated by references to the transcript, but by citation to said
depositions, tends to taint the entire Brief of CrossRespondant.
Point II of Cross-Respondant's Brief is entitled
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"THE TH I AL COURT'S F r:: J< :>iGS ,\RE AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE
RECORD", yet the "recurd" used by Cross-Respondant is not
the record admitted i.n the trial and lends a sandy foundation
to the Cross-Respondant's conclusions in the entire Brief,
and especially sections labelled Point II, Point III and
Point IV.
Cross-Appellant is also concerned about the accuracy of many of Cross-Respondant's citations.

For example,

on page 10 of Cross-Respondant's brief, he states that MARION
and his wife continued to approach VERE with offers (to buy
the Hunt property) from third parties, but the only credibile
citation to support that statement is found in the transcript
on page 38, lines 5-10, that is simply a statement by MARION'S
wife, wherein she said she had talked with a "Mr. Gardner"
whom she reported, wanted to buy the property.

That is

hardly the kind of "offer" one might place great dependt.:nce
upon.
Cross-Respondant also cites transcript, page 52,
lines 24-26 as authority for the statement that MARION
presented offers to purchase the Hunt property to VERE. However, in reading the transcript, it is evident that that
~as

not the fact at all.

VERE BECKSTROM if

~!ARION

Counsel for Cross-Respondant asked
had not told him a JOE ROMERO

wanted to purchase the Hunt property?

VERE's answer was

clearly that ROMERO was represented to him by MARION as wanting
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the "Lewis" property and not the "Hunt" property (See
transcript, page 52,

lines 27-30 and page 53, lines l-15).

Counsel for MARION BECKSTROM continuously but unsuccessfully
attempted to badger VERE BECKSTROM into saying the alleged
offer was for the Hunt property, but he unwaiveringly insisted it was for the Lewis property.

Counsel may have

wanted him to say it was for the Hunt property, but he did
not do so.
Cross-Respondant' s Brief also cited the transcript,
page 77, lines l-4 as support for his assertion that MARION
had transmitted offers to sell the Hunt property to his
brother, VERE.

As a matter of record,

that very citation

from the transcript refers only to a statement purportedly
made by MARION that "---he would like to sell the property--not that he had an offer by anyone to buy it.

Cros~-Appel

lant cites these instances as examples to the Court of the
unreal iabili ty of some of the citations in Cross-Respondant's
Brief. They, together with the use of improper citations
of "evidence", which,

in fact, was not admitted in the triaL

raises grave questions concerning the credibility of the
Cross-Respondant's Brief.
The statement previously cited from Cross-Respondant's Brief, that "---MARION and his wife continued to appro'
VERE with offers from third parties (Cross-Respondant's
Brief, page 10) turns out to be a single casual telephone
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, .Jl from MARION's wife.

That statement is both not sub-

stantiated by the record and is misleading.
Another example of misinterpretation of the record,
and evidence found therein in Cross-Respondant's Brief, is
found in the first paragraph of page 12 of his Brief. CrossRespondant there states:

"Another contradiction in his

(VERE's) testimony as to the conversation is evidenced by
the statement in his Affidavit (Affidavit in Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, paragraph 11, Record 92).
~gain,

the Cross-Respondant cites a document that was not

part of the trial transcript or evidence therei~

that the

conversation wherein MARION disclaimed his interest, took
place in Pine Valley.

Attial, of course, he maintained the

conversation took place at Pickett's, a store in St. George."
This observation was intended, of course, to discredit
VERE BECKSTROM, the witness, who, as the record shows, had
suffered a stroke (Tr. P63, LLl-8) and was hard of hearing
(Tr. P42, LL14-19).
The true facts, as revealed by the record, however,
are that during the trial VERE BECKSTROM did indeed testify
that one conversation referred to took place in front of
Pickett's in St. George, as the Cross-Respondant points out.
Though the Affidavit referred to by Cross-Respondant is not
a part of the trial record, Cross-Respondant has referred
to it in an attempt to discredit VERE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Equity and justice demand that the issue be
clarified, and though VERE did state in the Affidavit as
Cross-Respondant contends, that MARION made a visit to him
at Pine Valley.

It also states in Paragraph 13 thereof as

follows:
"13.
That thereafter in 1959, Affiant (VERE
BECKSTROM), while on his way to theCourthouse
(in St. George) to pay taxes on the Washington
County property, happened to meet MARION in St.
George, Utah and asked him to help pay the
taxes on the Hunt Property in Iron County
and MARION refused to do so; that Affiant
said that if the taxes were not paid on the
property, it would be taken 'by the State'
and that MARION said, 'Let the State sell
it, I am not putting anything more into it."'
That is not a contridiction as the Cross-Respondant represented
it was, and would lead the Court to believe, but, in fact,
just the opposite!
Cross-Respondant's Point III, commencing on page 13
of his Brief, goes to great lengths to establish that one
co-tenant cannot normally claim property from his co-tenant
by adverse possession.

He somehow tries to equate that

principal, even if it is the law, with the estoppel theory
here urged by Cross-Appellant.

He states the acts relied

on to create an estoppel were insufficient because "they
(the acts of VERE) were not adverse to MARION's claim or
interest in the property." (Cross-Respondant's Brief, P. 14.
LL7-8)

That observation is little more than a "Red Herring".
Cross-Respondant misconstrues the meaning of an
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pstoppel.

An estoppel does not arise out of the acts or

words of one claiming the benefit of it.

Black's Law

Dictionary, in defining Equitable Estoppel quotes from Crane
Co. of Minnesota v. Advance Plumbing & Heating Co., 177 Minn.
132, 224 N.W., 847, 848 and says:
"Elements of equitable estoppel are representations intentionally made under
such circumstances as show that [the]
party making them intended, or might
reasonably have anticipated, that [the]
party to whom they are made, or to whom
they are communicated, will rely and act
on them as true."
Thus, the acts in the instant case which are of significance,
are those acts or statements of MARION's, and not statements
or acts of VERE's, which were "adverse to MARION's claim or
interest in the property."
Adverse possession is not urged by Cross-Appellant
and is not the theory upon which it urges this Court to
reverse the Trial Court's decision!
In support of his attempt to divert the attention of
the Court from the true issue involved, Cross-Respondant
cites certain cases:
Sperry v. Tolley , 114 Utah 303, 199 P 2d 542, cited
by Cross-Respondant, merely says that the conduct of the parties
over the years did not evidence an intent to partition the
premises.

This, of course, has no relationship to an Estoppel

in Pais or Equitable Estoppel as urged upon the Court by
Cross-Appellant.
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Cross-Respondant also cites Chatworthy v. <:::_lyde,
l Utah 2d 251, 265 P.2d 420, but again, that case deals
with the princip_al of adverse possession by co-tenants, not
Equitable Estoppel.

The Court, in that case, in fact, held

contrary to Cross-Respondant 1 s assertion that given proper
acts showing open notorious and adverse possession by one
co-tenant against another co-tenant, adverse possession
apply even to co-tenants.

m~

However, again, Cross-Appellant

is not claiming adverse possession by VERE against MARION.
Adverse possession has nothing to do with the real
issue in this case!
Heiselt v. Heisel t, 10 Utah 2d. , 126, 349 P. 2d

J7j

again cited by Cross-Respondant, merely said that there wu
not the necessary elements to establish adverse Possession
between co-tenants.
Again, on page 16 of Cross-Respondant 1 s

Brief,~

misconstrues the nature of Equitable Estoppel when he says:
"Clearly, VERE 1 s continued payment of the taxes is not adve
to MARION, and does not constitute a basis of estopping
Mation (sic) from asserting his claim as a co-tenant."
It is not the act of VERE in paying taxes that
estops MARION; it is MARION 1 s various statements to VERE tr..
he wanted nothing more to do with the property, and would
soon see the property go to the State (County) on a tax sa>
as pay any tax on it, and, as supported by his letting Vl~
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pay all the taxes and proceed thereafter as if J,G, \TRE,
were the sole owner, without any objection or act directed
to disabuse VERE of that supposition or belief, which caused
VERE, in reliance thereupon to act to his detriment, and
which are the acts of estoppel invoked by Cross-Appellant
in this case.
The true nature of an Equitable Estoppel is that
MARION, after he has made statements and done acts calculated,
and which he knew VERE would rely upon, may not, after that
reliance, deny them or attempt to retract them.
Equitable Estoppel has nothing to do with Adverse
Possession nor or any of Cross-Defendant's other cases cited
in his section on Point III, Manzy v. Wilson, 131 S.E.2d 389,
Atlantic Refining Company v. Golson, 127 S02d 341, Bevan v.
Shelton, 469 P.2d 245 and Fleisher v. Terber, 259 N.Y. 60,
181 N. E. 14, any more in point than the previous cases.
Manzy Supra deals with a decedent who had attempted
to convey to one daughter the entire interest in a parcel of
land in which he only owned a half interest.

The Court held

the other co-tenant was not "Estopped" from claiming her
interest in the property simply because a probate of the
decedent's estate had occurred and she had not objected to the
probate for a period of seventeen years.

Implicit in that

ruling is the recognition of the fact that she herself had
done nothing affirmatively to cause the decedent, or the
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dau~hter

to whom he had attempted to convey the entire

parcel, to rely upon her, the co-tenant's, acts.
The Bevin case Supra deals with a co-tenant, who
was in possession of the property and failed to pay taxes
upon it, as was his responsibility, both legally and morally
according to the Court, thereby allowing the property to be
put up for sale at a tax sale by the County, then buying it
himself,

in an obvious scheme to deprive his co-tenant of

his interest in the property.
The Court said he could not do that, but again, thi'
was not a case remotely connected with the principal of
"Equitable Estoppel."
The Court in the Bevin case did make one sage observation very applicable to the instant case.

Quoting from

Burnet v. Cole, 193 Okla. 25, 140 P.2d 1015, the Court said:
"Defendant contends that he owed Plaintiff
no duty to pay the taxes on the mineral estate.
The the right to acquire a tax title
against another doesnot always rest on the
question of whether a duty is owed to such
other person.
Defendant at least had a duty
to pay his own taxes and a question is
whether he may profit by neglecting his own
duty."
In the present case, it would not appear that ~lARlc
should refuse to pay his taxes, or even a share of them, th~
later profit from that refusal, after VERE had paid them.
The Atlantic Refining case Supra, again simply
reiterates that one co-tenant cannot divest other co-tPntn!'
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by letting property go to a tax sale and then buy it hi· cr·Jf.
Again, certainly not even close to being in point with the
current case.
The Fleischer case, Supra is much related to the
Bevan and Atlantic cases, except that the scheme used therein
was to fail to pay the mortgage payments, then buy at the
foreclosure sale.

Certainly that is no more in point with

the instant case, than the previous cases cited.
Cross-Respondant's Point IV in his Brief, page 17,
finally deals with the principal and substantive issue involved in this case, but unfortunately upon a somewhat
misconstrued or misleading basis.

For example, Cross-Respondant,

on page 17 of his Brief, attempts to draw two distinctions
therein:
"1.
Estoppel to assert title to realty
is more difficult to establish than
estoppel to assert rights under a contract
not dealing with real estate.

"2.
Estoppel to assert title to realty is
different than estoppel to divest title to
realty,"
and then proceeds to state that Cross-Defendant has "entirely
ignored" these distinctions.
To support this thesis, Cross-Respondant generalizes
as to distinction No. 1 above, but cites no authority, then
cites, to support his distinction No. 2, 31 C.J.S. Estoppel
150 and 28 Am Jur 2d, "Estoppel

and Waiver S81 and proceeds

tu comment further:
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"The distinction is between the rights of one 1,1J 0
has not yet est.ablished a legally recognized interest in
realty who seeks to assert title, and one who already has
legally recognized rights

in realty from which rights are tc

be effectually divested."
The Cross-Respondant, to support that premise,
quoted from 31 C.J.S., Estoppel sl50, but he skipped over
the extremely important and significant statement:

" .... a

person may, by his acts or conduct, preclude himself, on
clear and satisfactory grounds of justice and equity, from
asserting his title to or interest in land .... " (clearly a
case of divesting oneself of his title).

Cross-Respondant

quotes a portion of that same section that follows:
"There is considerable diversity of statement as to whether title to land can be
divested by an estoppel in pais, some
decisions declaring broadly that it can
be so divested or transferred .... On the
other hand, other decisions hold that title
to realty cannot be divested or conveyed by
estoppel." 31 C.J.S. , Estoppel §150 (1964).
That much of the quotation, as provided by CrossRespondant,

indeed supports as much as it denigrates the

principal that title might be divested by an Estoppel in
Pais, merely noting that Courts have disagreed.

However,

\Iii

true impact of that quotation is found in the portion immediately following the last word quoted by Cross-Respondar.·
which he did not include in his Brief.

The omitted portiu~

continues on to say:
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"However, it has hcen said that whether,
in StrictneSS Of cpPeCh, a title may be
'created' by estoppel is a refinement of
no value in the light of modern equity
,jurisprudence, for although the title
does not pass, a conveyance will be decreed by a court of equity in accordance
with the maxim discussed in equity section
106 that equity considers that done which
should have beGn done."
(Emphasis added)
In other words, the distinction No. 2, drawn by
Cross-Respondant, is a "refinement of no value" in the minds
of the editors of C.J.S. and "in light of modern equity
jurisprudence."
In fact, C.J.S. quotes from Nissen v. McCafferty,
a New York case, 195 N.Y.S. 549 202 App. Div 528 as follows:
"Estoppel in Pais does not create a technical title in land.
Its effect is to
preclude the party from denying the effect
of his statements or admission designed to
influence, or which have influenced the
conduct of another, and when so applied,
it is as actual as a deed from the party
estopped. " (Emphasis added)
Cross-Defendant submits that this is the situation
that exists in the present case.
Cross-Respondant also cited 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel
and Waiver i'Jsl, but does not quote from it.

The reason is

obvious, of course, upon reading that section.

It says:

"Although the courts are inclined to
be somewhat more reluctant to give
effect to estoppels when they effect
the title to real estate than in other
instances, the rule is generally well
sGttled in the modern law that the title
to land or real property may pass by an
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equitable estoppel, which j~ pffectual
tota:Ke the tltTe to land frum 0ne person
and vest it in another where justice requires that such action be done."
(Emphasis and double emphasis is added).
This is, of course, just opposite to what the
Cross-Respondant cited the Section to support!
That Section in Am Jur goes on to lay down some
ground rules and parameters, then adds:
"Occasionally, the question is raised as
to whether the title to real property
can be passed by means of an Estoppel in
Pias, since there is no writing made by
the person sought to be estopped in such
cases, and the statute of frauds requires
some memorandum in writing in connection
with the transfer of title of real property.
The prevailing rule is to the effect that to permit the transfer of
title by operation of equitable estoppel
does not contravene the statute, and
that the legal title may be so transferred.
In other states in which it is
held that a legal title may be precluded
by equity from setting up the defense of
the statute of frauds, and that title may
pass by operation of an equitable estoppel
in spite of the statute.
In only a few
jurisdictions bas it ever been held that
the statute of frauds prevents the passage
of title by means of the doctrine of
equitable estoppel."
Section 82 of the same Am Jur Treatise says:
"An owner may be stopped to assert his
title to realty whereby his renunciation
or disclaimer of title he has induced
another to believe and act thereon to his
detriment."
It cites Thorn v. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N.W. 461

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

li'

su]'j'"rt of that enunciation.

·J,J'C ll:.~nt

T!J(,m is also cited by Cross-

in his initial Brief before this Court.
The Cross-Respondant cites Blackburn v. Florida

\\'est Coast Land Development Co., 109 So.2d 413 as an example
of a court which does not allow title to be divested by
Estoppel in Pais.

The court did, of course, make the state-

ments quoted by Cross-Respondant, but the case was, in
reality, a case involving a boundary line dispute and did
not involve a case where one party made affirmative representations, disclaiming any further claim to the property, upon
which the other relied as is present in the instant case.
and therefore,

is not truly applicable to this case.

Cross-Respondant makes much of his distinction
between "asserting" title and "divesting" title.

Cross-

Appellant points out that the two theories are merely opposite
sides of the same coin.

The fact is that if "A" asserts a

title against "B", who claims title and the court awards it
to "A", who has asserted a title, the court has divested
the title from "B".

In the present case, if one looks at the

situation from VERE's standpoint, it may be a case of
"assertion of title", while from MARION's standpoint, it is
"divestiture" of title.
happening.

In either case, the same thing is

Because he previously represented he was through

with the property, and wanted nothing more to do with it,
including paying taxes, etc., and because VERE relied upon
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that rcprcsc:ntation, VERE is "asserting title" and
would be divested of title.

~l/\RION

And, by the same token, it may

be said, that now that VERE, relying upon his brother's
representation, has assumed he owned the property, and has
attempted to sell it, MARION is now "asserting" his title.
In reality, the whole argument is an exercise in semantics
and as C.J.S. Supra noted, the distinction "is a refinement
of no value ... "
It should be noted, that if Cross-Respondant insists upon belaboring the "Assertion-Divestiture" distinctio:
it is in reality, he who is asserting a title.

He filed

suit in the first instance to "assert" his title against
his brother, VERE!
Cross-Respondant, in his Brief, takes issue with
Cross-Appellant's citation to Holsteen v. Thompson case,
169 N.W. 2d 554, and adds an additional portion of the
Section from 28 Am Jur 2d , "Estoppel and Waiver"

~81,

quoted in the Holsteen case.
The portion added by Cross-Respondant commences
with this statement:
"Thus, by intentional misrepresentation,
misleading conduct, or wrongful concealment, a person may preclude himself from
asserting his legal title to land or from
enforcing an encumbrance on, or maintaining an interest in, real estate."
This addition to the quote from Am Jur 2d only
strengthens VERE's position.

MARION certainly "intcntiona:
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r ~''represented"

to VERE that he

uo

longer claimed an interest,

'trpported by his refusal to pay the taxes, or even his share
uf the taxes, to keep from losing the property, when in
fact,

he now does claim an interest in the property.

His

former statements and acts must have been misrepresentation.
The additional portion of Am Jur 2d quoted by
Cross-Respondant on pages 22 and 23 of his Brief, states in
general that there must be "fraudulent representation, concealment or such conduct or negligence as will amount to
fraud in law .... " and that the other party was actually
misled to his injury.
in the instant case.

Certainly, these elements are found
VERE was told by MARION that he had no

further interest in the property, and "let the State take it."
VE~E.

then, relying on that, continued to put his own time,

effort and money into it, and ultimately sold it when he
grew too old to handle it, and is now faced with a damage
judgment of potentially several thousand dollars by the
buyer!
It is true, one must believe VERE's version of the
key conversation, i.e., the one in St. George, when VERE
asked MARION to pay or help pay the taxes.

But that belief

is easily supportable.
MARION himself admitted that he told VERE the
property was worthless and he couldn't make it, and wasn't
going to farm it anymore, and didn't want anything to do
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with it during the com"

n~ation

at Pine Valley. (Tr. P<:?9

LLll-15)
Further, on cross examination by counsel for
Cross-Plaintiff, NORMAND LAUB, when asked if he had been
asked by VERE to make a payment on taxes in front of Pickett
in St. George, MARION admitted he had, but then when furthe
asked if he had said "let the State take it", he, MARION,
merely said he could not remember.
merely said he couldn't remember.

He did not deny it,
(Tr. P29, LL19-30)

MARION also admitted he knew the effect of failun
to pay property taxes, i.e. , that the property may be taken
and sold for taxes.

(Tr. P30 LL-1-13)

MARION did not directly deny the statement attributed to him when first asked it, only at best that he
didn't remember it, which of course, is to be expected if hf
is now to get the property back.

On the other hand, VERE

is very specific that, upon asking MARION to pay the taxes
due in 1959, MARION said "let the State take it and pay it
off."

VERE was then cut off from adding something

in regard thereto by counsel for Cross-Respondant.
LL4-9)

additio~:

(Tr. P4S

(The Court must remember that in 1959 the property

did not appear to have any value, and may not have had much
value.

It is only in recent years, when land and water ha·.,

so inordinately appreciated, that its value is realized.)
Again, on cross examination by his own counsel
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(Cross-Respondant had originally called him as his wirJ1css),
VERE retold the same conversation unequivocably and without doubt.

(TR P64 LL2-5)
The Trial Court, did not, in fact, make any determi-

nation as to which version of the conversation in front of
Pickett's in St. George was correct.
and Conclusions of Law).

(See Findings of Fact

The Court circumvented the

necessity of making that determination by refusing to even
consider the estoppel theory, (TR Pl02 LLl0-20) leaving counsel
for Cross-Appellant no ground upon which, nor any basis, to
even argue to the Trial Court the issue of Estoppel in Pais
or Equitable Estoppel.

This, Cross-Respondant, argues was

reversible error on the part of the Trial Court.
Cross-Respondant in his Brief, cites cases from
only three states:

Florida, Louisiana and Colorado, which

he says, do not permit the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel to
divest record title; and three states:

Michigan, Kansas, and

California, where the doctrine is circumscribed by the requirement that faLserepresentation or fraud must first be
shown.
The use of the term "False representation of fraud"
is significant.

What does it mean?

Thorn v. Thorn, 208 Minn. 461, 294 N.W. 461, cited
and relied upon heavily in Cross-Appellant's initial Brief,
contributes an excellent answer to that question:
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"The vi tal principal i ,, t!1~· c he who by
his language or conduc~ 1<-:•ds another
to do what he would not oth0rwise have
done, shall not subject such person to
loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon which he acts,
Such a
change of position is sternly forbidden.
It involves fraud and falsehood, and the
law abhors both.
This remedy is always
to be applied as to promote the ends of
justice." (Emphasis added)
The Thorn case, as the Court will nom in CrossAppellant's opening Brief, involved one party refusing to
pay a "mortgage payment", just as MARION has refused to pay
a "tax payment".
The Court in the Thorn case sagely and succinctly
noted:
"If Plaintiff had done nothing at all with
respect to the mortgage, which his words
and conduct showed was his intention, he
would have lost the land anyway.
Instead
of letting the land go to foreclosure, h€
consented to the taking over by Clifford,
who, relying on his words and conduct which
continued throughout the period from 1932
to the commencement of this action, acted
thereon and changed his position to his
prejudice."
The Thorn case sets up almost identical circumstanc
to the instant case.
The Cross-Respondant admits there may be some
jurisdictions which refuse to recognize Equitable Estoppel
to effect title to real property.

Cross-Respondant

cites~

three, but regardless of the situation in other jurisdictio·
this appears to be a case of first impression in Utah and

1

Court has the opportunity to adopt the posit ion, as enunci'.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case

10

Est<

1'1 cJ!

:

~upra

that " .... This rc

0:,'

(Equitable

s always to be applied as to prorr,ote the ends of

justice."
Cross-Appellant respectfully submits that there is
sufficient evidence in the record, in spite of the Trail
Court's attempt to excise from the trial, the issue of
Equitable Estoppel, to show that MARION did represent to
VERE (a false and fraudulent representation, if you will)
that he was divesting himself of interest in the property by
the conversations he had in Pine Valley in 1959 (Tr P29, LL6-15) and in front of Picketts in St. George (Tr P29 LL 19-30;
Tr P48, LL 409; and Tr P64 LL 2-5).
Furthermore, Cross-Appellant's version of the
conversations is corroborated by the vast amounts of mostly
uncontradicted evidence which shows that MARION acted as
though that was what he had said, until he discovered that
VERE had been able to sell the property profitably, and he
filed this suit to recover half of the property.

In addition,

VERE had been the only productive contributor to acquiring
and maintaining the property over the 21 or 22 years involved.
Cross-Appellant submits that this case involves
the age-old situation of two partners in a business venture
which at one point appears to be hopeless, and unproductive,
so one partner abandons it, and leaves the other partner
high and dry to either lose everything, or pull it out on
his own.

When he does, by industry, hard work and introduction
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of additional

t

,. z·Hl money in the

V<~nture,

m:~kc·:o

it,

at

least not a totally losing venture, the first partner
suddenly wants back in to share the fruits of the second
partner's industry,

faith and hard work.

Unfortunately,

for the second partner, this business venture involves real
property which now serves as a trap to snap off the head of
the industrious partner, if Cross-Respondant is successful
in this appeal.
Cross-Appellant respectfully submits that the
Trial Court's decision should be reversed and it should be
ordered to enter its Order quieting the entire title in
VERE BECKSTROM, or such other order as will effect that
result.
DATED this

day of - - - - - - - - - - ' 197;

J. MacArthur Wright
Attorney for Cross-Appellant
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